Spinoza

Ethics

(Curley translation)

– CORE POINTS –

Contents/Parts:

1. of God
2. of the nature and origin of the mind
3. of the origin and nature of the affects
4. of human bondage, or of the power of the affects
5. of the power of the intellect, or of human freedom

 

FIRST PART – ON GOD

 

Definitions

 

D1: causa sui

D2: finite

D3: substance

D4: attribute

D5: mode

D6: God

D7: free

D8: eternity

 

Axioms

 

A1: Is in itself

A2: conceived through itself

A3: cause and effect

A4: knowledge of effect

A5: understanding through itself

A6: a true idea must agree with its object

A7: essence without existence

 

Propositions

 

P1: A substance is prior in nature to its affections.

P2: Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.

P3: If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.

P4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.

P5: In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.

P6: One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

P7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.

P8: Every substance is necessarily infinite.

P9: The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.

P10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.

P11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.

P12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided.

P13: A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible.

P14: Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.

P15: Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.

P16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect. )

P17: God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.

P18: God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.

P19: God is eternal, or all Gods’ attributes are eternal.

P20: God’s existence in his essence are one and the same.

P21: All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.

P22: whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which, through the same attribute, exists necessarily and his infinite, must also exist necessarily and be infinite.

P23: Every mode which exists necessarily and is infinite has necessarily had to follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute, modified by a modification which exists necessarily and is infinite.

P24: The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

P25: God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

P26: A thing which has been determined to produce an effect has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to produce an effect.

P27: A thing which has been determined by God to produce an effect, cannot render itself undetermined.

P28: Every singular thing, or anything which is finite and has a determinant existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinant existence; and again, this course also can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another, foot which is also finite and has a determinant existence, and so on, to infinity.

P29: In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.

P30: An actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend God’s attributes and God’s affections, and nothing else.

P31: The actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, love, etc., must be referred to Natura Naturata, not to Natura Naturans.

P32: The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.

P33: Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.

P34: God’s power is his essence itself.

P35: Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power, necessarily exists.

P36: Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.

Appendix

 

 

SECOND PART ­– ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

 

Definitions

 

D1: Body

D2: Essence

D3: idea

D4: adequate idea

D5: Duration

D6: Reality = perfection

D7: singular things

 

Axioms

 

A1: Essence of man

A2: ‘Man thinks.’

A3: intentionality

A4: bodies affected

A5: We feel and perceive only bodies and thoughts

 

Propositions

 

P1: Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

P2: Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing. [thus God=Nature]

P3: in God there is necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence.

P4: God’s idea, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many modes, must be unique.

P5: The formal being of ideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other attribute. I.e., ideas, both of God’s attributes and of singular things, admit not the objects themselves, or the things perceived, as their efficient cause, but God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing.

P6: The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute. [see Ep. 66, etc.]

P7: The order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Scholium: “…the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehend it under this attribute now, now under that.  … Some of the Hebrews seemed to have seen this, as if through a cloud, when they maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same.” [ref. to Maimonides especially (“cloud”).] [p. 451]

P8: The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of the singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes.

P9: The idea of a singular thing which actually exists has God for a cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing which actually exists; and of this [idea] God is also the cause, insofar as he is affected by another [NS: idea], and so on, to Infinity.

Dem: “…The order and connexion of ideas (by P7) is the same as the order and connexion of causes. .”

P10: The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.

P11: The first thing that constitutes the actual being of a human Mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which actually exists.

Cor.: “The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human mind, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing only partially, or inadequately.” [p. 456; cf. Maimonides (‘infinite intellect and man’s mind); cf. abstraction]

P12: Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind; i.e., if the object of the idea constituting human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind.

P13: The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body, or a certain mode of Extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

Cor.: “Man consists of the mind and the body, and that the human body exists, as we are aware of it. “.

Scholium: “From these [propositions] we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what should be understood by the union of mind and body. But no one will be able to understand it adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of our body. For the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. … And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must also be said of the idea of any thing.” [p. 458] [panpsychism]

“In proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its mind is more capable than others with perceiving many things at once.  … [thereby] we can know the excellence of one mind over the others …” [ibid.]

 

A1’: All bodies either move or are at rest.

A2’: Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly.

L1: Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and rest , speed and slowness, and not by reason of substance.

L2: All bodies agree in certain things.

L3: A body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on, to infinity.

L4: If, of a body, or of an individual, which is composed of a number of bodies, some are removed, and at the same time as many others of the same nature take their place, the [NS: body, or the] Individual will retain its nature, as before, without any change of its form.

L5: If the parts composing an individual become greater or less, but in such a proportion that they all keep the same ratio of motion and rest to each other as before, then the Individual will likewise retain its nature, as before, without any change of form.

L6: If certain bodies composing an Individual are compelled to alter the motion they have from one Direction to another, but so that they can continue their motions and communicate them to each other in the same ratio as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature, without any change of form.

L7: Furthermore, the Individual so composed retains its nature, whether it, as a whole, moves or is at rest, or whether it moves in this or that direction, so long as each part retains its motion, and communicates it, as before, to the others.

 

Postulates

 

1. The human body is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite. [cf. Nietzsche]
2. Fluid  hard

• Body multiply effected

1. Body’s dependence on other bodies
2. Fluid parts of body
3. multiple locomotive power

 

P14: The human Mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways.

P15: The idea that constitutes the formal being [esse] of the human Mind is not simple, but composed of a great many ideas.

P16: The idea of any mode in which the human Body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human Body and at the same time the nature of the external body.

Cor. 1: From this it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of its own body.  [cf. AN Whitehead, vectorization]

Cor. 2: It follows, second, that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies. I have explained this by many examples in the Appendix of Part One.

P17: If the human body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of an external body, the human mind will regard the same external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body.

: …We clearly understand what is the difference between the idea of, say, Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man, say in Paul. for the former directly explains the essence of Peter’s body, and does not involve existence, except so long as Peter exists; but the latter indicates the condition of Paul’s body more than Peter’s nature [NS: see P16C2],  And therefore, while that condition of Paul’s body lasts, Paul’s Mind will still regard peter’s present to itself, even though Peter does not exist.

[Veridicality discussion]

P18: If the human Body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the Mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.

P19: The human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of affections by which the body is affected.

P20: There is also in God an idea, or knowledge, of the human Mind, which follows in God in the same way and is related to God in the same way as the idea, or knowledge come out of the human Body.

P21: This idea of the Mind is united to the Mind in the same way as the Mind is united to the Body.

Scholium: …The idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one in the same attribute , viz. Thought. …

P22: The human Mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections.

P23: The Mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.

Dem. …The knowledge of the mind is also not related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. And so (again by P11C) to that extent the human Mind does not know itself. … [cf. Abstraction]

P24: The human Mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human Body.

P25: The idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body.

P26: The human Mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own Body.

Cor. Insofar as the human Mind imagines an external body, it does not have adequate knowledge of it. [i.e. Abstraction, semi-realism]

P27: The idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

P28: The ideas of the affections of the human Body, insofar as they are related only to the human Mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused. [cf. Descartes]

Scholium: In the same way we can demonstrate that the idea that constitutes the nature of the human mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct …

P29: The idea of the idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human Mind.

Cor.: From this it follows that so long as the human mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it does not have an adequate, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives ideas of the affections of the body (by P23).

Scholium: I say expressly that the Mind has come on not an adequate, but only a confused knowledge, of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the common order of nature, i.e., so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous encounters with things , to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to understand their agreement, differences, and oppositions. … [cf. ILG, etc.]

P30: We can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of our Body.

P31: We can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things which are outside us.

P32: All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true.

Dem.: For all ideas which are in God agree entirely with their objects …

P33: There is nothing positive and ideas on account of which they are called false.

P34: Every idea that in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

P35: Full city consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.

Scholium: [e.g.] … Men are deceived in that they think themselves free  [NS: i.e., they think that, of their own free will, they can either do a thing or forbear doing it], an opinion which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom—that they do not know any cause of their actions. … for all are ignorant of what the will is, and how it moves the body… .

Similarly, when we look at the sun, we imagine it is about 200 feet away from us, an error that does not consist simply in this imagining, but in the fact that while we imagine it this way, we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this imagining. … because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our body is affected by the sun. [i.e. abstraction]

P36: Inadequate and confused ideas follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas.

Dem.: All ideas are in God (by 1P15); and, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by P32), and (by P7C) adequate. and so there are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of someone …

P37: What is common to all things (on this see L2, above) and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.

P38: Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately. [common notions, universals]

Cor.: …There are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men.

P39: If something is common to, and peculiar to, the human Body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected , and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the Mind.

P40: Whatever ideas follow in the Mind from ideas that are adequate in the mind are also adequate.

Schol. 1: With this I have explained the cause of those notions which are called common, and which are the foundations of our reasoning. …

Terms like being, thing and something. … [result from imagining] All the bodies confusedly come out without any distinction, and comprehend them as if under one attribute, viz . under the attribute of Being, Thing, etc. …

Those notions they called Universal, like man, horse, dog, etc., have arisen from similar causes, viz. because so many images (e.g., of men) are formed at one time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining …

Each [person] will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his body.

Schol. 2: From what has been said above, it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions:

1. From singular things …
2. from signs … [these two are knowledge of the first kind]

• Finally, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things … . this I shall call reason and the second kind of knowledge.

1. In addition to these two kinds of knowledge, there is … another, Third kind, which we shall call intuitive knowledge. And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things. …

1, 2, 3, 6 [proportional]

 

P41: Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, whereas knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarily true.

P42: Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

P43: He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.

Schol.: …our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (by P11C)… [cf. noetic quality]

P44: It is of the nature of Reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent.

Cor. 1: It depends only on the imagination that we regard things as contingent, both in respect to the past and in respect to the future. …

Cor. 2: It is of the nature of Reason to perceive things under certain species of eternity.

Dem.: It is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent (by P44). and it perceives this necessity of things truly (by P41), i.e. (by IA6), As it is in itself. But (by 1P16) this necessity of things is the very necessity of God’s eternal nature. Therefore, it is of the nature of reason to regard things under this species of eternity.

Add to this that the foundations of Reason are notions (by P38) which explain those things that are common to all, and which (by P37) do not explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they must be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity, q.e.d.

P45: Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God.

Schol.: By existence here I do not understand duration, i.e., existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity. For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes (see 1P16). I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. concerning this, see 1P24C.

P46: The knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.

P47: The human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence.

Schol. From this we see that God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, and so can form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in P40S2 and of whose excellence and utility we shall speak in Part V.

But that men do not have so clear knowledge of God as they do of the common notions comes from the fact that they cannot imagine God, as they can bodies, that they have joined the name God to the images of things which they’re used to seeing…

most errors consist only in are not rightly applying names to things…

And most controversies have arisen from this, that men do not rightly explain their own mind, or interpret the mind of the other man badly.

P48: In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.

Schol.: In the same way it is also demonstrated that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc.  from this it follows that these and similar faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from particulars. So intellect and will are to this or that idea, or to this or that volition ‘stone-ness’ is to this or that stone, foreman to Peter or Paul. [but not ‘Conatus’] …

By will I understand a faculty of affirming and denying, and not desire. …

by Ideas I understand, not the images that are formed at the back of the eye … but concepts of Thought …

P49: In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea.

Cor.: The will and the intellect are one and the same.

Dem.: The will and the intellect are nothing apart from the singular volitions and ideas themselves …

Schol.: Distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept, of the Mind, and the images of things that we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish between ideas and the words by which we signify things. … ideas, images, and words … For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions , which do not at all involve the concept of thought.

[will =/= intellect, but ‘will’ means judging (affirming/denying). Therefore conatus does differ from intellect (and will).]

Buridan’s ass referred to.

We find this daily in our , and I do not believe there is anyone who thinks that while he is dreaming he has a free power of suspending judgement concerning the things he dreams, and of bringing it about that he does not dream the things he dreams he sees. Nevertheless, it happens that even in dreams we suspend judgement, viz. when we dream that we dream. …

This doctrine, then, in addition to giving us complete Peace of Mind, also teaches us wherein our greatest happiness, or blessedness, consists: viz. In the knowledge of God alone …

This doctrine contributes to social life, insofar as it teaches us ; and also insofar as it teaches that each of us should be content with his own things , and should be helpful to his neighbour, not from unmanly compassion , partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason  … I shall show this in the Fourth Part.

Finally, this doctrine also contributes, to no small extent, to the common societie insofar as it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led, not so that they may be slaves, but that they may do freely the things that are best. …

 

 

THIRD PART ­– ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS

Preface

[Man and his affects (feelings, emotions) are part of Nature, not outside it.]

 

Definitions

 

D1: I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through it alone.

D2: [We act when we are adequate cause; we are acted on when we are only a partial cause.]

D3: By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.

Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by the affect and action; otherwise, a passion.

 

Postulates

 

Post. 1: The human body can be affected in many ways in which its power of acting is increased or diminished …

Post. 2: The human Body can undergo many changes, and nevertheless retain impressions, or traces come out of the objects …

 

Propositions

 

P1: Our Mind does certain things [acts] and undergoes other things, viz. insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things.

Dem.: …Those  [ideas] that inadequate in the Mind are also adequate in God … insofar as he also contains in himself, at the same time, the minds of other things. …

Cor.: From this it follows that the mind is more liable to passions the more it has inadequate ideas, and Conversely, is more active the more it has adequate ideas.

P2: The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion, to rest or do anything else (if there is anything else).

Dem.: …What determines the Mind to thinking is a mode of thinking and not of Extension … The Body cannot determine the Mind …

[i.e. no mind-body interaction as they are substantially identical.]

Schol.: …The Mind and the Body are one and the same thing , which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. …

Hence the order of actions and passions of our body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind. …

Sleepwalkers …animals … the body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things which its Mind wonders at. …

Again, no one knows how, or by what means, the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give the body, nor with what speed it can move it. … [people] Do not know what they are saying  . they are ignorant of the true cause of that action  … [mental causation, lack of ‘transordinal nomology’/bridge laws]

…

I add here the very structure of the human Body, which, in the ingenuity of its construction, far surpasses anything made by human skill – not to mention that I have shown above, that infinitely many things follow from nature, under whatever attribute it may be considered. [evolution…] …

So the infant believes he freely wants the milk; the angry child that he wants vengeance; and the timid, flight. So the drunk believes it is from a free decision of the mind that he speaks the things he later, when sober, wishes he had not said. So the madman, the chatterbox, the child, and a great many people of this kind believe they speak from a free decision of the Mind, when really they cannot contain their impulse to speak. [free will] …

So experience itself, no less clearly than reason, teaches that men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined …

Those who are torn by contrary effects do not know what they want, and those who are not moved by any effect or very easily driven here and there.

All these things, indeed, show clearly that both the decision of the and the appetite and the determination of the Body by nature exist together – or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained through, the attribute of Thought, in which we call a Determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest. …

we can do nothing from a decision of the Mind unless we recollect it. Eg, we cannot speak a word unless we recollect it. And it is not in the free power of the to either recollect the thing or forget it. …

We dream, finally, that, from a decision of the Mind, we do certain things we do not dare to do while we wake. [and of course dream narratives are not consciously chosen but given, yet we think within the dream that we are free.] …

And so these decisions of the mind arise by the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist. Those, therefore, who believe that they either speak or are silent, or do anything from a free decision of the mind, dream with open eyes.

 

P3: The actions of the mind of rise from adequate ideas alone ; Passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.

Dem.: …So far as the mind has inadequate ideas (by P1), it necessarily is acted on.  …

P4: No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause.

[“thing” is vague]

P5: Things are of a contrary nature, i.e., cannot be in the same subject coma insofar as one can destroy the other.

P6: Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.

Dem.: … No thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by P4). On the contrary , it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by P5). …

P7: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.

Dem.: … The power, or striving, by which it strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself … [cf. will to power]

P8: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

P9: Both insofar as the Mind is clear and distinct ideas, and insofar as it has confused ideas, it strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in its being an it is conscious of the striving it has.

[Note: the Mind is conscious of its essential striving, but a ‘thing’ is not necessarily conscious of its striving. This is a form of panexperientialism therefore, if experience can include striving.]

Schol.: When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite. This Appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man … [But ‘Will’ in Book 2, P49 was mere affirmation and negation, and thus identical to the intellect…]

Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.

From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; On the contrary , we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it , and desire it.

P10: An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our Mind, but is contrary to it.

P11: The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our bodies power of acting, increases or diminishes, age restrains, our minds power of thinking.

Dem.: … By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection. And by Sadness, that passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection.  The affect of Joy which is related to the mind and body at once I call Pleasure or Cheerfulness, and that of Sadness, Pain or Melancholy.

… Apart from these three [Desire, Joy, Sadness] I do not acknowledge any other primary effect. For I shall show in what follows that the rest arise from these three. …

P12: The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the bodies power of acting. [ambition, etc.]

P13: When the mind imagines those things that diminish or restrain the Body’s power of acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things that exclude their existence.

Cor.: From this it follows that the Mind avoids imagining those things that diminish or restrain its or the Body’s power.

Schol.: From this we understand clearly what love and hate are. Love is nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause, and Hate is nothing but Sadness with the accompanying idea of an external cause. … [ILG]

 

P14: If the Mind has once been affected by two affects at once, then afterwards, when it is affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.

 

P15: Any thing can be the accidental cause of Joy, Sadness, or Desire.

Schol. From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate somethings without any cause known to us, but only (as they say) from Sympathy or Antipathy.

 

P16: From the mere fact that we imagine a thing to have some likeness to an object that usually affects the Mind with Joy or Sadness, we love it or hate it, even though that in which The thing is like the object is not the efficient cause of these effects.

 

P17: If we imagine that a thing which usually affects us with an effect of Sadness is like another which usually affects us with an equally great effect of Joy, we shall hate it and at the same time love it.

Schol. … this is called vacillation of mind…

For the human Body (by IIPost. 1) Is composed of a great many individuals of different natures …  [cf. Nietzsche: individuals composed of hierarchy of wills to power] [panpsychism]

From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many and contrary affects.

 

P18: Man is affected with the same affect with Joy or Sadness from the image of a past or future thing as from the image of a present thing.

Schol. 2: Hope is nothing but an inconstant Joy which has arisen from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt; Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant Sadness, which also has arisen from the image of a doubtful thing . Next, if the doubt involved in these effects is removed, hope becomes konfidence, and fear, despair – viz. a joy or sadness which has arisen from the image of a thing we feared or hoped for. Finally, Gladness is a joy which has arisen from the image of a past thing whose outcome we doubted, while Remorse is a sadness which is opposite to Gladness.

 

P19: He who imagines that what he loves us destroyed will be saddened; but he who imagines it to be preserved, will rejoice.

Dem. Insofar as it can, the mind strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the bodies power of acting … [cf. Nietzsche, Will to power; and Short Treatise: ‘Providence’ (i.e. conatus)]

 

P20: He who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice. Kay

 

P21: He who imagines what he loves to be affected with Joy or Sadness will also be affected with Joy or Sadness; and each of those affects will be greater or lesser in the lover as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.

 

P22: If we imagine someone to affect with Joy a thing we love, we shall be affected with Love toward him. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect the same thing with Sadness, we shall also be affected with Hate toward him.

Schol.: P21 Explains to us what is, which we can define as Sadness that has arisen from injury to another.  … Next, Love toward him who has done good to another we shall call Favour, and Hatred toward him who has done evil to another we shall call Indignation.  …

And so also we Favour him who has benefited someone like us, and are Indignant at him who was injured one like us.

 

P23: He who imagines what he hates to be affected with sadness will rejoice; If, on the other hand, he should imagine it to be affected with joy, he will be saddened. And both these effects will be the greater or lesser, as its contrary is greater or lesser in what he hates.

 

P24: If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we hate, we shall be affected with hate toward him also. On the other hand, if we imagine him to affect the same thing with sadness, we shall be affected with love toward him.

Schol. These and similar effects of hate are related to Envy which, therefore, is nothing but hate, insofar as it is considered so to dispose a man that he is glared at another little fortune and saddened by his good fortune.

 

P25: We strive to affirm, concerning ourselves and what we love, whatever we imagine to affect with joy ourselves or what we love. On the other hand, we strive to deny whatever we imagine affects with sadness ourselves or what we love.

 

P26: We strive to affirm, concerning what we hate, whatever we imagined to affect it with But related to desire it is called emulation , which, therefore, is nothing but the desire for a thing which is generated in us from the fact that we imagine others like us to have the same desire. sadness, and on the other hand to deny whatever we imagined to affect it with joy.

Schol. … It easily happens that a man thinks more highly of himself and what he loves than is just, and on the other hand, thinks less highly than is just of what he hates. When this imagination concerns the man himself who thinks more highly of himself than his just, it is called Pride, and is a species of Madness, because the man dreams, with open eyes, that he can do all those things which he achieves only in his imagination, in which she therefore regards as real and triumphs in…

 

P27: If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.

Schol. This imitation of the affects, when it is related to sadness is called Pity (on which, see P22S); But related to desire it is called Emulation …

Cor3: As far as we can, we strive to free a thing we pity from its suffering. …

Dem: Whatever affects with sadness what we pity, affects us also with a like sadness (by P27). And so (by P13) we shall strive to think of whatever can take away the things existence, or destroy the thing …

Schol[2]: This will, or appetite to do good, born of our pity for the thing on which we wish to confer a benefit, is called Benevolence… [Note: Benevolence is therefore based on selfishness.]

 

P28: We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it, or will lead to Sadness. [cf. conatus]

 

P29: We shall strive to do also whatever we imagined men to look on with Joy, and on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men are averse to.

Schol.: This striving to do something (and also to omit doing something) solely to please men is called Ambition …

Next , the joy with which we imagine the action of another by which he has striven to please us I call Praise. on the other hand, the sadness with which we are averse to his action I called Blame.

 

P30: If someone has done something which he imagines affects others with joy, he will be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done something which he imagines affects others with sadness, he will regard himself with sadness.

Schol.:  Since Love (by P13S) is Joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and Hate is Sadness, accompanied also by the idea of an external cause, this Joy and sadness are species of love and hate. … Joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, we shall call Love of Esteem, and the sadness contrary to it, Shame – I mean when the joy or sadness arise from the fact that the man believes that he is praised or blamed. Otherwise, I shall call joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause, Self-esteem, and the sadness contrary to it, Repentance.

 

P31: If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hate something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereby love, desire or hate it with greater constancy. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love, or the opposite, then we shall undergo vacillation of mind.

Schol.: This striving to bring it about that everyone should approve his love and hate is really Ambition (see P29S). and so we see that each of us, by his nature, wants the others to live according to his temperament …

 

P32: If we imagine that someone enjoys something that only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it.

Schol.: …From the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are compassionate, it also follows that the same men are envious and ambitious. …

 

P33: When we love a thing like ourselves, we strive, as far as we can, to bring it about that it loves us in return.

 

P34: The greater the affect with which we imagine nothing we love to be affected toward us, the more we shall exult at being esteemed.

 

P35: If someone imagines that a thing he loves is united with another by as close, or buy a closer , bond of friendship and that which he himself, alone, possessed the thing, he will be affected with Hate toward the thing he loves, and will Envy the other.

Schol.: This hatred toward a thing we love, combined with envy, is called Jealousy , which is therefore nothing but a vacillation of mind born of love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of another who is envied. [Love toward a woman … lover … prostitution]

 

P36: He who recollects a thing by which he was once pleased desires to possess it in the same circumstances as when he first was pleased by it.

Schol.: This sadness, insofar as it concerns the absence of what we love, is called Longing.

 

P37: The desire that arises from sadness or joy, and from hatred or love, is greater, the greater the affect is.

Dem. Sadness diminishes or restrains a man’s power of acting … . Next, since joy (by the same P11S) increases or aids Mans power of acting , it is easily demonstrated in the same way that the men affected with joy desires nothing but to preserve it

…

 

P38: If someone begins to hate a thing he has loved come out so that the love is completely destroyed, then (from an equal cause) he will have a greater hate for it than if he had never loved it, and this hate will be the greater as the love before was greater.

 

P39: He who hates someone will strive to do evil to him, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from this; and on the other hand, he who loves someone will strive to benefit him by the same law.

Schol.: By Good here I understand every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be. And by Evil, every kind of sadness, and especially what frustrates longing. For we have shown above (in P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it. Consequently, what we are averse to we call evil. [beyond good and evil]

So each one, from his own effect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the greedy man judges an abundance of money best, and poverty worst. The ambitious man desires nothing so much as a steam and reads nothing so much as shameful stop to the envious nothing is more agreeable than anothers unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another’s happiness . And so, each one, from his own effect, judge is a thing good or bad, useful or useless. …

 

P40: He who imagines he is hated by someone, and believes he has given the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return.

Schol.: The striving to do evil to him we hate is called Anger; and the striving to return an evil done as is called Vengeance.

 

P41: If someone imagines that someone loves him, and does not believe he has given any cause for this, he will love [that person] in return.

Schol.: … This reciprocal love, and consequent (by P49) striving to benefit one who loves us, and strives (by the same P39) to benefit us, is called Thankfulness, or Gratitude. … Cruelty …

 

P42: He who has benefited someone – whether moved to do so by love or by the hope of esteem – will be saddened if he sees his benefit accepted in an ungrateful spirit.

 

P43: Hate is increased by being returned, but can be destroyed by Love.

 

P44: Hate completely conquered by love passes into love, and the love is therefor greater than if the hate had not preceded it.

 

P45: If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hate toward a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate that [person].

 

P46: If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation.

 

P47: The joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed, or affected with some other evil, does not occur without some sadness of mind.

 

P48: Love or Hate – say, of Peter – is destroyed if the sadness the hate involves, or the joy the love involves, is attached to the idea of another cause, and each is diminished to the extent that we imagined that Peter was not its only cause.

 

P49: Given an equal cause of love, love toward a thing will be greater if we imagine the thing to be free than if we imagine it to be necessary. And similarly for hate.

Dem. … If we should imagine as necessary the thing that is the cause of this affect, then (by the same ID7) we shall imagine it to be the cause of the effect, not alone, but with others. And so (by P48) our love or hate toward it will be less, q.e.d.

[i.e. why understanding necessity occasions peace of mind]

 

P50: Anything whatever can be the accidental cause of hope or fear.

Schol.: … This is the source of the Superstitions by which men are everywhere troubled. …

 

P51: Different men can be affected differently by one in the same object; And one in the same man can be affected differently at different times where one in the same object.

Schol.: … Because each one touches what is good and what is bad, what is better and what worse (see P39S) it follows that men can vary as much in judgement as in affect. … [timidity and daring and cowardice therefore all relative]

Because the things which he believes will make for joy or sadness, and which he therefore strives to promote or prevent (by P28), often only imaginary  … we easily conceive that a man can often be the cause both of his own sadness and his own joy … . because men believe themselves free, these affects are very violent (see P49).

 

P52: If we have previously seen an object together with others, or we imagine it has nothing but what is common to many things, we shall not consider it so long as one which we imagined to have something singular.

Schol.: This affection of the mind, or this imagination of a singular thing, insofar as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder. But if it is aroused by an object we fear, it is called consternation , because wonder at an evil keeps a man so suspended in considering it that he cannot think of other things by which he could avoid that evil. But if what we wonder at is a Man’s prudence, diligence, or something else of that kind, because we consider him as far surpassing us in this, then the wonder is called Veneration. Otherwise, if what we wonder at is the man’s anger, envy, etc, the wonder is called Dread. [cf. Sublime] …

To Wonder is opposed Disdain …

 

P53: When the mind considers itself in its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.

 

P54: The Mind strives to imagine only those things that posit its power of acting.

Dem. The mind’s striving, or power, is its very essence (by P7)… [cf. conatus]

 

P55: When the Mind imagines its own lack of power, it is saddened by it.

Schol.: This Sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness is called Humility. But Joy arising from considering ourselves, is called Self-love or Self-esteem.

And since this is renewed as often as a man considers his of acting, it also happens that everyone is anxious to tell his own deeds, and show off his powers , both of body and of mind – and that men, for this reason, are troublesome to one another. … For whenever anyone imagines his own actions, he is affected with Joy (by P53) , and with the greater Joy, the more his actions express perfection…

So everyone will have the greatest gladness from considering himself, when he considered something in himself which he denies concerning others. … It is clear, therefore, that men are naturally inclined to Hate and Envy. …

[But] not infrequently we admire and venerate men’s virtues. …

 

Cor.: No one envies another’s virtue unless he is an equal.

Dem.: [virtue= power of acting]

…He cannot be saddened because he considers a virtue in someone unlike himself. Consequently he also cannot envy him. …

We shall not envy him these virtues anymore than we envy trees their height, or lions their strength.

 

P56: There are as many species of joy, sadness, and desire, and consequently of each affect composed of these (like vacillation of mind) or derived from them (like love, hate, hope, fear, etc.), as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

Dem.: Joy and Sadness – and consequently the affects composed of them or derived from them – are passions (by P11S). That we unnecessarily acted on (by P1) insofar as we have inadequate ideas …

There are as many species of joy, sadness, love, hate, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

But Desire is the very essence, or nature, of each [man] insofar as it is conceived to be determined, by whatever constitution he has, to do something (see P9S). …

Therefore, there are as many species of desire as there are species of joy, sadness, love, etc. …

Schol.: For by gluttony, drunkenness, lust com agreed, and ambition we understand nothing but an immoderate love or desire for eating, drinking, sexual union, wealth, and esteem. …

For our purpose, which is to determine the powers of the affects and the power of the Mind over the affects …

 

P57: Each effect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one from the essence of the other.

Dem.: All the affects are related to desire, joy, or sadness … But desire is the very nature, or essence, of each [individual] …

Next, joy and sadness are passions by which each one’s power, or striving to persevere in his being, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by P11 and P11S). but the striving to persevere in on’es being, insofar as it is related to the mind and body together, we understand appetite and desire (see P9S). So joy and sadness are the desire, or appetite, itself insofar as it is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, by external causes. I. e. … It is the very nature of each [individual]. …

 

Schol.: From this it follows that the affects of the animals which are called irrational (for after we know the origin of the mind, we cannot in anyway doubt that the lower animals feel things) differ from men’s affects as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both the horse and the man are driven by a lust to procreate; but one is driven by an equine lust, the other by a human lust. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fish, and birds must vary. … That life with which each one is content, and that gladness, is nothing but the idea, or soul, of the individual. …

There is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunk is lead and the gladness of philosopher possesses. …

 

P58: Apart from the joy and desire that our passions, there are other affects of joy and desire that are related to us insofar as we act.

Dem.: When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting it rejoices (by P53). but the mind necessarily considers itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by IIP43). … Desire also is related to us insofar as we understand …

 

P59: Among all the effects that are related to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none that are not related to joy or desire.

Schol.: All actions that follow from effects related to the mind insofar as it understands I relate to Strength of character, which I divide into tenacity and nobility. For by Tenacity I understand the desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being. By Nobility I understand the desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and joined them to him in friendship. …

So moderation, sobriety, presence of mind in danger, etc., species of tenacity whereas courtesy, mercy, etc., a species of nobility. …

 

Definitions of the Affects

 

1. Desire
   1. …I really recognise no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man is conscious of his appetite or not, the appetite still remains one and the same. [i.e. the subconscious]
2. Joy
   1. Is a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.

• sadness
  1. Is a man’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.

1. wonder
   1. … I recognise only three primitive, or primary, affects: joy, sadness, and desire. …
2. disdain
3. love
   1. Is a joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But the definition of those authors who define love as a will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved expresses a property of love, not its essence …[cf. ‘intellectual love of God, finite intellect into infinitive intellect, bk V. cf. Zaehner: God mysticism as sexual]

• hate
• inclination

1. aversion
2. devotion
3. mockery

• hope
• fear
• confidence

1. despair

• gladness
• remorse
• pity
• favour

1. indignation

• overestimation
• scorn
• envy
• compassion
• self-esteem
• humility
• repentance
• pride
• despondency
• love of esteem
• shame
• longing
• emulation
• thankfulness or gratitude
• benevolence
• anger
• vengeance
• cruelty or severity
• timidity

1. daring

• cowardice
• consternation
• human kindness or courtesy
• ambition
• gluttony
• drunkenness
• greed
• lust

 

General Definition of the Affects

 

An affect that is called a passion of the mind is a confused idea, by which the mind our firms of its body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, when it is given, determines the mind to think of this rather than that.

Exp.: I say … that an affect, or passion of the mind, is a confused idea. For we have shown (P3) that the mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or confused, ideas. …

 

All the ideas that we have of bodies indicate the actual constitution of our own body (by IIP16C2) more than the nature of the external body. … [cf. AN Whitehead]

 

When I say a greater or lesser force of existing than before … [I mean] that the idea which constitutes the form of the effect affirms of the body something which really involves more or less of reality than before. …

 

The essence of the mind consists in this (by IIP11 and P13), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and we understand by perfection the very essence of the thing , it follows that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens that it affirms of its body … something which involves more or less reality than before. …

 

 

 

FOURTH PART ­– ON HUMAN BONDAGE, OR THE POWERS OF THE AFFECTS

 

Preface

 

Man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the effects I call Bondage. For the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune…

 

In this Part, I have undertaken to demonstrate the cause of this, and what there is of good and evil in the affects. …

 

[Perfect = completed]

 

But after men began to form universal ideas, and devised models of houses, buildings, towers, etc., … It came about that each one called perfect what he saw agreed with the universal idea he had formed of this kind of thing  … [i.e. nominalist.]

 

They regard these universal ideas as models of things, and believe that nature (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to them, and sets them before itself as models. So when they see something happen in nature which does not agree with the model they have conceived of this kind of thing, they believe that nature itself has failed or sinned, and left the thing imperfect. [cf. non-teleology; cf. evolution; anti-Creationist; anti-Platonist]

 

…Nature does nothing on account of an end. [but, conatus: end: self-preservation…? See next paragraph.]

 

That eternal and infinite being we call God, or Nature, acts from the same necessity from which he exists. … As he exists for the sake of no end, he also acts for the sake of no end. … What is called the final cause is nothing but a human appetite insofar as it is considered as a principle, or primary cause, of some thing. …

 

So habitation  [say] insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing more than this singular appetite [to build a house]. It is really an efficient cause, which is considered as a first cause, because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites.  … they are conscious of their actions and appetites, but not aware of the causes by which they are determined to want something. … [cf. free will and determinism]

 

Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are only modes of thinking …

By reality and perfection I understand the same thing. … Some [individuals] have more being, or reality, than others, we say that some are more perfect than others. …

 

As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another. For one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf.

 

But though this is so, still we must retain these words. … I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model. …

 

Indeed, the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing. But any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist; so they are all equal in this regard. [cf. eternal]

 

Definitions

 

D1: By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.

D2: By evil, however, I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from being Masters of some good.

D3: I called singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, while we attend only to the essence, which necessarily posits their existence or which necessarily excludes it.

D4: I call the same singular things possible … [when] we do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them. …

D5: by opposite affects … [I mean] those which pull a man differently, although they are of the same genus…

D6 … and affect toward a future thing, a present one, and a past. [estimation of time plateaus after a limit]

D7: By the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite. [‘end’ not final cause?…]

D8: by virtue and power I understand the same thing, i.e. (by IIIP7), Virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.

 

Axiom

 

There is no singular thing in nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another more powerful by which the first can be destroyed.

 

Propositions

 

P1: Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true.

Schol.: … For an imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of an external body – not distinctly, of course, but confusedly . This is how it happens that the mind is said to err.

For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about 200 feet away from us. In this we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; But when its distance is known, the error is removed, not the imagination, i.e., the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only so far as the body is affected by it. … [cf. AN Whitehead] [cf. P9, Dem.]

 

P2: we are acted on, insofar as we are a part of nature, which cannot be conceived through itself, without the others.

 

P3: the force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

 

P4: It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

Dem.: … man’s power, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature’s infinite power, i.e. (by IP34), of its essence.  …

[cf. Whitehead, vectorization, relation, etc.]

 

P5: The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, or not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

Dem.: The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone  … the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in our being; but … it must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own …

 

P6: The force of any passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man.

 

P7: An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the effect to be restrained.

 

P8: The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.

Dem.: We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being … [i.e.] what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Therefore … insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with joy or sadness, we call it good or evil. And so knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of joy or sadness itself …

but this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the mind is united to the body … i.e. … this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or … from the idea of the body’s affection; it is only conceptually distinguished from it. Therefore, this knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of it …

 

P9: An affect whose cause we imagined to be with us in the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be with us.

 

P10: We are affected more intensely toward a future thing which we imagine will quickly be present, than if we imagined the time when it will exist to be further from the present. We are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing we imagine to be not long past, then if we imagined it to be long past.

 

P11: An affect toward a thing we imagine as necessary is more intense, other things equal, then one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent, or not necessary.

 

P12: An affect toward a thing which we know does not exist in the present, in which we imagine as possible, is more intense, other things equal, then one toward a contingent thing.

 

P13: An affect toward a contingent thing which we know does not exist in the present is milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a past thing.

 

P14: no affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.

Dem.: An affect is an idea by which the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before …

 

P15: A Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other Desires which arise from affects by which we are tormented.

 

P16: a Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this knowledge concerns the future, can be quite easily restrained or extinguished by a desire for the pleasures of the moment.

 

P17: A desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can be restrained much more easily still by a desire for things which are present.

Schol.: With this I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil arouses disturbances of the mind, and often yields to lust of every kind. …

Ecclesiastes [1:18] also seems to have had the same thing in mind when he said: “he who increases knowledge increases sorrow.”

I do not say these things in order to infer that it is better to be ignorant then to know, or that there is no difference between the fool and the man who understands when it comes to moderating the affects. My reason, rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both our nature’s power and its lack of power, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects, and what it cannot do. …

 

P18: A desire that arises from joy is stronger, other things equal, than one that arises from sadness.

Dem.: Desire is the very essence of man … i.e. … a striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being. So a desire that arises from joy is aided or increased by the affect of joy itself …

Schol.: … Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it demands that everyone loves himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, want what will really lead man to a greater perfection, and absolutely, that everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can. This, indeed, is as necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part …

The foundation of virtue is this very striving to preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in man’s being able to preserve his being;…

those who kill themselves are weak-minded and completely conquered by the external causes contrary to their nature. … [ref. suicide]

To man … there is nothing more useful than man. …

Man, I say, can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as it were, one mind and one body; That all should strive together, as far as they can, to preserve their being; and that all, together, should seek for themselves the common advantage of all. …

I have done this to win, if possible, the attention of those who believe that this principle – that everyone is bound to seek his own advantage – is the foundation, not of virtue an morality, but of immorality. … the contrary is true … [cf. Adam Smith, Hobbes, et al.]

 

P19: From the laws of his own nature, everyone necessarily wants, or is repelled by, what he judges to be good or evil.

 

P20: The more each one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, i.e., to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; Conversely, insofar as each one neglects his own advantage, i.e., neglects to preserve his being, he lacks power.

Dem.: Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by man’s essence alone …

Schol.: No one, therefore, unless he is defeated by causes external , and contrary, to his nature, neglects to seek his own advantage, or to preserve his being. [ref. subconscious]

 

P21: No one can desire to be blessed, to act well and to live well, unless at the same time he desires to be, to act, and to live, i.e., to actually exist.

 

P22: No virtue can be conceived prior to this [virtue] (viz. the striving to preserve oneself).

 

P23: A man cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue insofar as he is determined to do something because he has inadequate ideas, but only insofar as he is determined because he understands.

 

P24: Acting absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but acting, living, and preserving our being (these three signify the same thing) by the guidance of reason, from the foundation of seeking one’s own advantage.

 

P25: No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.

 

P26: What we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; nor does the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judge anything else useful to itself except what leads to understanding.

 

P27: We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, except what really leads to understanding or what can prevent us from understanding.

 

P28: Knowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good; Its greatest virtue is to know God.

[ref. intellectual love of god]

 

P29: Any singular thing whose nature is entirely different from ours can neither aid nor restrain our power of acting, and absolutely, no thing can be either good or evil for us, unless it has something in common with us.

 

P30: No thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; But insofar as it is evil for us, it is contrary to us.

 

P31: Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature it is necessarily good.

 

P32: Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree in nature.

 

P33: Men can disagree in nature insofar as they are torn by affects which are passions; and to that extent also one and the same man is changeable and inconstant.

 

P34: Insofar as men are torn by affects which are passions, they can be contrary to one another.

 

P35: Only insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, must they always agree in nature.

Cor.2: When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another. …

Schol.: … Man is a God to man. …

Still, it rarely happens that men live according to the guidance of reason. Instead, their lives are so constituted that they are usually envious and burdensome to one another. … Men still find from experience that by helping one another they can provide themselves much more easily with the things they require, and that only by joining forces can they avoid the dangers that threaten on all sides …

 

P36: The greatest good of those who seek virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally.

Schol.: …It pertains to the essence of human mind (by IIP47) to have an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence. [ref. intellectual love of God]

 

P37: The good witch everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men; And this desire is greater as his knowledge of God is greater.

 

Alternative Dem.: The good witch man wants for himself and loves, he will love more constantly if he sees that others love it (by IIIP31). so … he will strive to have the others love the same thing. and because this good is common to all (by P36), and all can enjoy it, he will therefore (by the same reason) strive that all may enjoy it. …

Schol.: Again, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I relate to Religion. The desire to do good generated inners by our living according to the guidance of reason, I call Morality. …

lack of power consists only in this, that a man allows himself to be guided by things outside him…

It is clear but the law against killing animals is based more on empty superstition and unmanly compassion than sound reason. The rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches as the necessity of joining with men, but not with the lower animals, or with things whose nature is different from human nature. We have the same right against them that they have against us. Indeed, because the right of each one is defined by his virtue, or power, men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against men. Not that I deny that the lower animals have sensations. But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own advantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us. For they do not agree in nature with us, and their affects are different in nature from human affects (see IIIP57S). …

everyone, by the highest right of nature, judges what is good and what is evil, considers his own advantage according to his own temperament … avenges himself … and strives to preserve what he loves and destroy what he hates …

In order, therefore, that men may be able to live harmoniously and be of assistance to one another, it is necessary for them to give up their natural right … By this law, therefore, Society can be maintained …

From this we easily understand that there is nothing in the state of nature which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil ; For everyone who is in the state of nature considered only his own advantage , and decides what is good and what is evil from his own temperament, and the only insofar as he takes account of his own advantage. … So in the state of nature no sin can be conceived.

But in the civil state, of course, it is decided by common agreement what is good or what is evil. … Sin, therefore, is nothing but disobedience, which for that reason can be punished only by the law of the state. …

Again, in the state of nature there is no one who by common consent is master of anything … all things belong to all. … In the state of nature nothing is done which can be called just or unjust. …

From this it is clear that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, not attributes that explain the nature of the mind. …

 

P39: Those things are good which bring about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest the human body’s parts have to one another; on the other hand, those things are evil which bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another.

Dem.: To be preserved, the human body requires a great many other bodies … But what constitutes the form of the human body consists in this, that its parts communicate their emotions to one another in a certain fixed proportion…

Schol.: …I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another. …

 

P40: Things which are of assistance to the common Society of men, or which bring it about that men live harmoniously, are useful; Those, on the other hand, are evil which bring discord to the state.

 

P41: Joy is not directly evil, but good; Sadness, on the other hand, is directly evil.

Dem.: Joy … is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is increased or added. Sadness, on the other hand, is an effect by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained. …

 

P42: Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but it’s always good; melancholy, on the other hand, is always evil.

 

P43: Pleasure can be excessive and evil, whereas pain can be good insofar as the pleasure, or joy, is evil.

 

P44: Love and desire can be excessive.

Schol.: … there are those in whom one affect is stubbornly fixed … [cf. Jung, complexes]

Greed, ambition, and lust really are species of madness, even though they are not numbered among their diseases.

 

P45: Hate can never be good.

Schol.: Note that he ran in what follows I understand by hate only hate toward men.

Cor. 1: Envy, mockery, disdain, anger, vengeance, and the rest of the affects which are related to hate or arise from it, are evil. …

Schol.: …Nothing forbids our pleasure except a Savage and sad superstition. for why is it more proper to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy? …

… No deity … takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune; nor does he ascribes to virtue our tears, our sighs, fear, and other things of that kind, which are signs of a weak mind. On the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, i.e., the more we must participate in the divine nature. To use things, therefore, and take pleasure in them as far as possible … this is the part of a wise man.

It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, the theater, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. …

 

P46: He who lives according to the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay the othe’rs hate, anger, and disdain toward him, with love, or nobility.

Dem.: …Hate is increased by being returned, and on the other hand, can be destroyed by love (by IIIP43), so that the hate passes into love …

Schol.: … one who is eager to overcome hate by love, strives joyously and confidently, resists many men as easily as one, and requires the least help from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield joyously, not from a lack of strength, but from an increase in their powers. …

 

P47: Affects of hope and fear cannot be good of themselves.

Schol.: … These affects show a defect of knowledge and a lack of power in the mind. For this reason also confidence and despair, gladness and remorse a signs of a mind lacking in power. For though confidence and gladness are affects of joy, they still presuppose that a sadness has preceded them, viz. hope and fear. Therefore come out the more we strive to live according to the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on hope, to free ourselves from fear, to conquer fortune as much as we can, and to direct our actions by the certain counsel of reason.

 

P48: Effects of overestimation and scorn are always evil.

 

P49: Overestimation easily makes the man who is overestimated proud.

 

P50: Pity, in a man who lives according to the guidance of reason, is evil of itself, and useless.

Dem.: For pity … is a sadness, and therefore …evil. …

Schol.: … He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and happen according to the internal laws and rules of nature, will surely find nothing worthy of hate to come a mockery or disdain , know anyone whom he will pity. …

Here I am speaking expressly of a man who lives according to the guidance of reason. For one who was moved to aid others neither by reason nor by pity is rightly called inhuman. 4 (by IIIP27) he seems to be unlike a man.

 

P51: Favour is not contrary to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.

Schol.: Indignation, as we define it (see Def. Aff. XX), Is necessarily evil (by P45).

 

P52: Self-esteem can arise from reason, and only that self-esteem which does arise from reason is the greatest there can be.

Schol.: Self-esteem is really the highest thing we can hope for. For … no one strives to preserve his being for the sake of any end. And because this self-esteem is more and more encouraged and strengthened by praise … and on the other hand, more and more upset by blame … we are guided most by love of esteem and can hardly bear a life in disgrace.

 

P53: Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.

Dem.: Humility is a sadness which arises from the fact that a man considers his own lack of power …

 

P54: Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; instead, he who repents what he has done is twice wretched, or lacking in power.

Schol.: … The mob is terrifying, if unafraid. So it is no wonder that the prophets, who considered the common advantage come and not that of the few, commended humility, repentance, and reverence so greatly. …

 

P55: Either very great pride or very great despondency is very great ignorance of oneself.

 

P56: Either very great pride or very great despondency indicates very great weakness of mind.

 

P57: The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates the presence of the noble.

Schol.: … Pride should be defined as a joy born of a Mans false opinion that he is above others. And the despondency contrary to this pride would need to be defined as a sadness born of a Man’s false opinion that he is below others.

But this being posited, we easily conceive that the proud man must be envious (see IIIP55S) and hate those most who are most praised for their virtues…

Although despondency is contrary to pride come out the despondent man is still very near the proud one. … Hence the proverb: misery loves company.

…No one is more prone to envy than the despondent man is, and why they strive especially to observe men’s deeds, more for the sake of finding fault than to improve them, and why, finally, they praise only despondency, and exult over it …

… I consider men’s affects and properties just like other natural things. …

 

P58: Love of esteem is not contrary to reason, but can arise from it.

Schol.: The love of esteem which is called empty it is a self-esteem that is encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude. When that ceases, the self-esteem ceases… That is why he who exults at being esteemed by the multitude is made anxious daily , strives, sacrifices, and schemes, in order to preserve his reputation. For the multitude is fickle and inconstant ; Unless ones reputation is guarded , it is quickly destroyed. Indeed come up because everyone desires to secure the applause of the multitude, each one willingly puts down the reputation of the other. … This gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in anyway possible. …

…like pity, shame, though not a virtue, is still good insofar as it indicates, in the man who blushes with shame, a desire to live honourably.

 

P59: To every action to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason, without that affect.

Alternate Dem.: … One and the same action is now good, and now evil. …

Schol.: … Every desire that of rose is from an affect which is a passion would be of no use if men could be guided by reason. …

 

P60: A desire arising from either a joy or sadness related to one, or several, but not to all parts of the body, has no regard for the advantage of the whole man.

 

P61: A desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive.

P62: Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one.

Dem.: Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the same species of eternity, or necessity (by IIP44C2) and is affected with the same certainty … . And whether the idea is of a future or a past thing or a present one, it will nevertheless be equally true (by IIP41), i.e., (by IID4), it will nevertheless always have the same properties of an adequate idea. … [cf. eternal]

Schol.: If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and determine by reason their times of existing, we would regard future things with the same affect as present ones, and the mind would want the good it conceived as future just as it wants the good it conceives as present. …

 

P63: He who is guided by fear, and does good to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

Schol. 1: The superstitious know how to approach people for their vices better than they know how to teach them virtues, and they strive, not to guide men by reason but to restrain them by fear, so that they flee the evil rather than love virtues. Such people aim only to make others as wretched as they themselves are, so it is no wonder that they are generally burdensome and hateful to men. …

Schol. 2: … A judge who condemns a guilty man to death – not from hate or anger, etc., but only from a love of the general welfare – is guided only by reason.

 

P64: Knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Dem.: Knowledge of evil (by P8) is sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. But sadness is a passage to a lesser perfection … which therefore cannot be understood through man’s essence itself … hence … it is a passion, which … depends on inadequate ideas.

Cor.: … if the human Mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.

 

P65: From the guidance of reason , we shall follow the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils.

 

P66: From the guidance of reason we want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.

Schol.: … the differences between a man who is led only by an affect, or by opinion, and one who is led by reason. For the former, whether he will or no, does those things he is most ignorant of, whereas the latter complies with no one’s wishes but his own, and does only those things he knows to be the most important in life, and therefore desires very greatly. Hence, I called the former slave, but the latter, a free man.

 

P67: A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.

Dem.: … A free man  i.e., one who lives according to the dictate of reason alone, is not led by fear … but desires the good directly … i.e. …acts, lives, and preserves his being from the foundation of seeking his own advantage. …

 

P68: If men were Born Free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free.

Schol.: … [This] Seem to have been indicated by Moses in that Story of the first man. For in it the only power of God conceived is that by which he created man … we are told that God prohibited a Free man from eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil , and that as soon as he ate of it, he immediately feared death, rather than desiring to live … [ref. Genesis, eden, adam]

 

P69: The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.

Cor.: In a free man, a timely flight is considered to show as much tenacity as fighting …

 

P70: A free man who lives among the ignorant stripes, as far as he can, to avoid their favors.

 

P71: Only free men are very thankful to one another.

 

P72: A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively.

[cf. Kant, formula of universalisibility]

 

P73: A man who is guided by reason is more free in a state, where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he obeys only himself.

Schol.: … A man strong in character considers this most of all, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and hence, that whatever he thinks is troublesome and evil, and Moreover, whatever seems immoral, dreadful, unjust, and dishonourable, arises from the fact that he conceives the things themselves in a way that is disordered, mutilated, and confused. For this reason, he strives most of all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove the obstacles to true knowledge, like hate, anger, envy, mockery, pride, and the rest of the things we have noted …

 

 

Appendix

 

[summary of Book IV]

 

1. Desires, necessity
2. desires, adequate ideas; actions, passions

• actions, good

1. intellect , reason , blessedness “Blessedness is nothing but that satisfaction of mind that stems from the intuitive knowledge of God. But perfecting the intellect is nothing but understanding God, his attributes, and his actions, which follow from the necessity of his nature full stuck so the ultimate end of the man who’s led by reason, i.e., his highest desire, … is that by which he is led to conceive adequately both himself and all things that can fall under his understanding. [cf.ILG]
2. … things are good only insofar as they ate man to enjoy the life of the mind.
3. … nothing evil can happen to a man except by external causes …

• It is impossible for man not to be a part of nature and not to follow the common order of nature. …
• It is permissible for us to avert, in the way that seemed safest, whatever there is in nature that we judged to be evil, or able to prevent us from being able to exist and enjoy a rational life. On the other hand, we may take for our own use, and use in anyway, whatever there is that we judge to be good, or useful for preserving our being and enjoying a rational life. And absolutely, it is permissible for everyone to do, by the highest right of nature, what he judges will contribute to his advantage.

1. Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing than other individuals of the same species. … We know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by reason …
2. envy, hate
3. Minds, however, are conquered not by arms, but by love and nobility.

• It is especially useful to men to form associations … to do those things which serve to strengthen friendships.
• Escaping the burden of men, tolerance
• …it is better to bear men’s wrongs calmly, and apply one’s zeal to those things that helped to bring men together in harmony and friendship.

1. … Especially necessary to bring people together in love, are the things which concern religion and morality. … [cf. noble lie]

• Harmony is also commonly born of fear … Pity, though it seems to present the appearance of morality.
• … To bring aid to everyone in need far surpasses the powers and advantage of a private person. … So the case of the poor falls upon society as a whole, and concerns only the general advantage.
• Favours and thanks
• A purely sensual love … a lust to procreate that arises from external appearance , and absolutely, or love that as a cause other than freedom of mind, easily passes into hate – unless … it is a species of madness. …

1. As for marriage, it certainly agrees with reason … not generated only by external appearance but also by a love of begetting children and educating them wisely …

• Flattery
• in despondency, there is a false appearance of morality and religion. And though the despondency is the opposite of pride, still the despondent man is very near the proud. See P57S.
• because shame itself is a species of sadness, it does not belong to the exercise of reason.
• Indignation
• courtesy
• Apart from men we know no singular thing in nature whose mind we can enjoy, in which we can join to ourselves in friendship, or some kind of association. And so whatever there is in nature apart from men, the principle of seeking our own advantage does not demand that we preserve it. Instead, it teaches us to preserve or destroy it according to its use, or to adapt it to our use in anyway whatever. [cf. ecology]
• …The more the body is capable of affecting, and being affected by, external bodies in a great many ways, the more the mind is capable of thinking (see P38 and P39). [ref. complexity of consciousness] Food, nourishment
• … The multitude … can imagine hardly any species of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause.
• … Those, however, who know the true use of money, and set bounds to their wealth according to need, live contentedly with little.
• … Joy consists in the fact that man’s power, insofar as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all things that bring Joy are good. [cf. Nietzsche] … excessive desires
• Superstition, on the other hand, seems to maintain that the good is what brings Sadness, and the evil, what brings Joy. [cf. Christianity] … As we are affected with a greater joy, we pass to a greater perfection, and consequently participate more in the divine nature. …
• But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. … We shall bear calmly those things which happened to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage demands … we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. …

 

 

 

FIFTH PART ­– ON THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT, OR ON HUMAN FREEDOM

 

Preface

 

Fifth Part to show the power of the mind or of reason over the affects.

 

To show what “freedom of mind, or blessedness, is.”

 

Descartes, “that most distinguished man” (esp. The Passions of the Soul), pineal gland, will.

 

“I cannot wonder enough that a philosopher of his caliber … should assume a hypothesis [pineal gland dualism] more occult than any occult quality.” [cf. Letter to Elisabeth of Bohemia, 28 June 1643]

 

“What, I ask, does he [Descartes] understand by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct concept does he have of a thought so closely united to some little portion of quantity? Indeed, I wish he had explained this union by its proximate cause . But he had conceived the mind to be so distinct from the body that he could not assign any singular cause, either of this union or of the mind itself. Instead it was necessary for him to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, i.e., to God.” …

“And of course, since there is no common measure between the will and motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the mind and those of the body. Consequently, the forces of the body cannot in anyway be determined by those of the mind.” … false

 

Axioms

 

A1: Two contrary actions in same subject cause change

A2: The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause … [cf. IIIP7]

 

Propositions

 

P1: In just the same way as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or images of things are ordered and connected in the body. [causal parallelism]

 

P2: If we separate emotions, or affects, from the thought of an external cause, and joined them to other thoughts, then the love, or hate, toward the external cause is destroyed, as are the vacillations of mind arising from these affects.

Dem.: For what constitutes the form of love, or hate, is joy, or sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause …

 

P3: An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

Dem.: An effect which is a passion is a confused idea … therefore, if we should form a clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea will only be distinguished by reason from the affect itself, insofar as it is related only to the mind …

Cor.: The more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is acted on by it.

 

P4: There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept.

Cor.: … An affect is an idea of an affection of the body …

Schol.: [Through understanding the affects] The result will be not only that love, hate, etc., are destroyed (by P2), but also that the appetites, or desires, which usually arise from such an affect, cannot be excessive …

In this way, all the appetites, or desires, our passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas, and are counted as virtues when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are determined to do something can arise as much from adequate ideas as from inadequate ones …

 

P5: The greatest affect of all, other things equal, is one toward a thing we imagine simply, and neither as necessary, nor as possible, nor as contingent.

Dem.: …Imagining a thing as free can be nothing but simply imagining it while we are ignorant of the causes by which it has been determined to act …

 

P6: Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects, or is less acted on by them.

Schol.: … Sadness over some good which has perished is lessened as soon as the man who has lost it realises that this good could not, in any way, have been kept. Similarly, we see that no one pities infants because of their inability to speak, to walk, or to reason, or because they live so many years, as it were, and conscious of themselves. … [i.e. realizing necessity frees one from affect of pity]

 

P7: Affects that arise from, or are aroused by, reason are, if we take account of time, more powerful than those that are related to singular things which we regard as absent.

 

P8: The more an affect arises from a number of causes concurring together, the greater it is.

 

P9: If an affect is related to more and different causes which the mind considers together with the affect itself, it is less harmful, we are less acted on by it, and we are affected less toward each cause, then is the case with another, equally great affect, which is related only to one cause, or to fewer causes.

Dem.: An effect is only evil, or harmful, insofar as it prevents the mind from being able to think …

 

P10: So long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affectations of the body according to the order of the intellect.

Schol.: By this power of rightly ordering in connecting the affections of the body, we can bring it about that we are not easily affected with evil affects … The best thing, then, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of living, or sure maxims of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the particular cases frequently and counted in life. …

For example, we have laid it down as a Maxim of life … that Hate is to be conquered by Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it with Hate in return. …

the highest satisfaction of mind stems from the right principle of living (by IVP52), And that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature …

For example, if someone sees that he pursues esteem too much, he should think of its correct use, the end for which it ought be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired, not of its misuse and emptiness, and men’s inconstancy, or other things of this kind, which only someone sick of mind thinks of. … It is certain that they [who] most desire esteem [are those] who cry out most against its misuse, and the emptiness of the world.

Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious – it is common to everyone whose luck is bad and whose mind is weak. For the poor man, when he is also greedy, will not stop talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich. In doing this he only distresses himself …

So also, one who has been badly received by a lover thinks of nothing but the inconstancy and receptiveness of women …

… Strive … to come to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with gladness which arises from the true knowledge of them, but not at all to consider men’s vices, or to disparage men, or to enjoy a false appearance of freedom. And he who will observe these [rules] carefully – for they are not difficult – and practise them, will soon be able to direct most of his actions according to the command of reason.

 

P11: As an image is related to more things, the more frequent it is, or the more often it flourishes, and the more it engages the mind.

 

P 12: the images of things are more easily joined to images related to things we understand clearly and distinctly than to other images.

 

P13: the more an image is joined with other images, the more often it flourishes.

 

P14: The mind can bring it about that all the Body’s affections, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.

Dem.: There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form some clear and distinct concept (by P4). and so it can bring it about (by IP15) that they are related to the idea of God, q.e.d.

 

P15: He who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and does so the more, the more he understands himself and his affects.

 

P16: This love toward God must engage the mind most.

 

P17: God is without passions, and is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness.

Dem.: All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (by IIP32), i.e., (by IID4), adequate. And so (by Gen. Def. Aff.), God is without passions.

Next, God can pass neither to a greater nor a lesser perfection, … hence … he is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness …

Cor.: strictly speaking, God loves no one, and hates no one. For God (by P17) is not affected with any affect of joy or sadness. …

 

P18: No one can hate God.

 

P19: He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return.

 

P20: This love toward God cannot be tainted by an affect of envy or jealousy: instead, the more men we imagine to be joined to God by the same bond of love, the more it is encouraged.

Dem.: This love toward God is the highest good which we can want from the dictate of reason (by IVP28), and is common to all men …

Schol.: … There is no affect which is directly contrary to this love and by which it can be destroyed. So we can conclude that this love is the most constant of all the affects, and insofar as it is related to the body, cannot be destroyed, unless it is destroyed with the body itself. … [cf. ILG…]

… See that the same affect troubles one [person] more than the other … For (by IVP5) the force of each affect is defined by the power of the external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge alone, whereas lack of power, or passion, is judged solely by the provision of knowledge …

No one is disturbed or anxious concerning anything unless he loves it, nor do wrongs, suspicions, and enmities arise except from love for a thing which no one can really fully possess.

From what we have said, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge – and especially that third kind of knowledge (see IIP47S), whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself – can accomplish against the affects. …

It begets a love toward a thing immutable and eternal (see P15), which we really fully possess (see IIP45), and which therefore cannot be tainted by any of the vices which are in ordinary love, but can always be greater and greater (by P15), and occupy the greatest part of the mind (by P16), and affect it extensively.

With this I have completed everything which concerns this present life. … So it is time now to pass to those things which pertain to the mind’s duration without relation to the body [alt rendering by Meijer following Appuhn: “…without relation to the body’s existence”].

 

[Note: this Love for God then is distinct from the immortal life – “intellectual love of God” – Spinoza is about to present… Also note troublesome use of “duration” here.]

 

P21: The mind can neither imagine anything, nor recollect past things, except while the body endures.

[i.e. The mental aspects of imagination and memory are conditioned by one’s body.]

 

P22: Nevertheless, in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body, under a species of eternity.

 

P23: The human Mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the Body, but something of it remains which is eternal.

Dem.: In God there is necessarily a concept, or idea, which expresses the essence of the human Body (by P22), an idea, therefore, which is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human Mind (by IIP13). But we do not attribute to the human mind any duration that can be defined by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body , which is explained by duration, and can be defined by time, i.e., (by IIP8C), we do not attribute duration to it [the human Mind] except while the body endures. However, since what is conceived, with a certain eternal necessity, through God’s essence itself (by P22) is nevertheless something, this something that pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal, q.e.d.

Schol.: There is, as we have said, this idea, which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity, a certain mode of thinking, which pertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal. And though it is impossible that we should recollect that we existed before the body – since there cannot be any traces of this in the body, and eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time – still, we feel and know by experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves.

Therefore, though we do not recollect that we existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a species of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence it has cannot be defined by time or explained through duration. Our mind, therefore, can be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body, and to that extent only does it have the power of determining the existence of things by time, and of conceiving them under duration. [Note: time is the measure of duration for Spinoza.]

 

P24: The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.

Dem.: this is evident from IP25C.

 

P25: The greatest striving of the mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge.

Dem.: The third kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its Def. in IIP40S2) [cf. ANW: abstraction to concreteness], and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God (by P24). therefore (by IVP28), the greatest virtue of the mind, i.e., (by IVD8), the mind’s power, or nature, or (by IIIP7) its greatest striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge, q.e.d. [see also IIP41-43: universals, noeticism, infinite intellect]

 

 

P26: The more the mind is capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of knowledge.

 

P27: The greatest satisfaction of mind there can be arises from this third kind of knowledge.

Dem.: … He who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection … and consequently … is affected with the greatest Joy, accompanied … by the idea of himself and his virtue. …

 

P28: The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but can indeed arise from the second.

 

P29: Whatever the mind understands under a species of eternity, it understands not from the fact that it conceives the body’s present actual existence, but from the fact that it conceives the body’s essence under a species of eternity.

Dem.: Insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it conceives duration, which can be determined by time, and to that extent it has only the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by P21 and IIP26). But eternity cannot be explained by duration (by ID8 and its explanation). Therefore, to that extent the mind does not have the power of conceiving things under a species of eternity.

But because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under species of eternity (by IIP44C2), and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the body’s essence under species of eternity (by P23), And beyond these two, nothing else pertains to the mind’s essence (by IIP13), this power of conceiving things under species of eternity pertains to the mind only insofar as it conceives the body’s essence under species of eternity, q.e.d.

Schol.: We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we can see them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we can see them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in the second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God (as we have shown in IIP45 and P45S).

[Note: this second way is rather similar to universal realism (not nominalism) as the notions are expressed here as ‘true’, ‘actual’, real’.]

 

P30: Insofar as our mind knows itself and the body under species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

Dem.: Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves necessary existence (by ID8). To conceive things under species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things insofar as they are conceived through god’s essence, as real beings, or insofar as through God’s essence they involve existence. Hence, insofar as our mind conceives itself and the body under species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God and knows, etc., q.e.d.

 

P31: The third kind of knowledge depends on the Mind, as on a formal cause, insofar as the Mind itself is eternal.

Dem.: The mind conceives nothing under species of eternity except insofar as it conceives its body’s essence under species of eternity … i.e. … except insofar as it is eternal. … therefore, The mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause of the third kind of knowledge (by IIID1)…

Schol.: Therefore, the more each of us is able to achieve in this [third] kind of knowledge, the more he is conscious of himself and of God, i.e., the more perfect and blessed he is. This will be even clearer from what follows.

But here it should be noted that although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity, nevertheless, for an easier explanation and better understanding of the things we wish to show, we shall consider it as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning to understand things under species of eternity, as we have done up to this point. …

 

P32: Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.

Dem.: From this [third] kind of knowledge there arises the greatest satisfaction of mind there can be (by P27), i.e. (by Def. Aff. XXV), Joy; this Joy is accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (by P30) it is also accompanied by the idea of God, as its cause, q.e.d.

Cor.: from the third kind of knowledge, there necessarily arises  an intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge there arises (by P32) joy, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause, i.e. (by Def. Aff. VI), Love of God, not insofar as we imagine him as present (by P29), but insofar as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call intellectual love of God.

 

P33: The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Dem.: For the third kind of knowledge (by P31 and IA3) is eternal. And so (by IA3), the love that arises from it must also be eternal, q.e.d. [i.e. eternal-Love (= “intellectual love”), not love-in-duration, i.e. not “Love” as an affect aforementioned. See P35C below.]]

Schol.: Although this love toward God has had no beginning (by P33), it still has all the perfections of love, just as if it had come to be (as we have feigned in P32C). There is no difference here, except that the mind has had eternally the same perfections which, in our fiction, now come to it, and that it is accompanied by the idea of God as an eternal cause. If joy, then, consists in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in the fact that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.

 

P34: Only while the body endures is the mind subject to effects which are related to the passions.

Dem.: An imagination is an idea by which the mind considers a thing as present … which nevertheless indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of the external thing … . an imagination, then, is an affect … insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body. So … only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to passions …

Cor.: From this it follows that no Love except intellectual Love is eternal.

Schol.: If we attend to the common opinion of men, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse it with duration, and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they [falsely] believe remains after death. [cf P21.]

 

P35: God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Dem.: God is absolutely infinite … i.e. … the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection, accompanied …. by the idea of himself, i.e. … by the idea of his cause. And this is what we said (by P32C) intellectual love is. [cf. Aristotle’s PM.]

 

P36: The mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained by the human mind’s essence, considered under a species of eternity; i.e., the mind’s intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself.  [key proposition]

Dem.: This love the mind has must be related to its actions (by P32C and IIIP3); it is, then, an action by which the mind contemplates itself, with the accompanying idea of God as its cause … i.e. … an action by which God, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind , contemplates himself, with the accompanying idea of himself; so (by P35), this love the mind has is part of the infinite love by which God loves himself, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and consequently that god’s love of men and the mind’s intellectual love of God are one and the same.

Schol.: From this we clearly understand wherein our Salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists, viz. in a constant and eternal love of God, or in god’s love for men. And this love, or blessedness, it called Glory in the sacred scriptures – not without reason. For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind, which is really not distinguished from glory (by Defs. Aff. XXV and XXX). For insofar as it is related to God (by P35), it is joy (if I may still be permitted to use this term), accompanied by the idea of himself. And similarly insofar as it is related to the mind (by P27).

Again, because the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is the beginning and foundation (by IP15 and IIP47S), it is clear to us how our mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God.

I thought this worth the trouble of noting here, in order to show by this example how much the knowledge of singular things I have called intuitive, or knowledge of the third kind … can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge I have called knowledge of the second kind. For although I have shown generally in

Part I that all things (and consequently the human mind also) depend on God both for their essence and their existence, nevertheless, that demonstration, though legitimate and put beyond all chance of doubt, still does not affect our mind as much as when this is inferred from the very essence of any singular thing which we say depends on God.

 

P37: There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Dem.: This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind insofar as it is considered as an eternal truth, through god’s nature (by P33 and P29). So if there was something contrary to this love, it would be contrary to the true; consequently, what could remove this love would bring it about that what is true would be forceful stop this (As is known through itself) is absurd. …

 

P38: The more the mind understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death.

Schol.: From this we understand what I touched on in IVP39S, and what I promise to explain in this part, viz. that death is less harmful to us , the greater the mind’s clear and distinct knowledge, and hence, the more the mind loves God.

Next, because (by P27) the highest satisfaction there can be arises from the third kind of knowledge, it follows from this that the human mind can be of such a nature that the part of the mind which we have shown perishes with the body (see P21) is if no moment in relation to what remains. But I shall soon treat this more fully.

 

P39: He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.

Schol.: …. He who has passed from being an infant or child to being a corpse is called unhappy. On the other hand, if we pass the whole length of our life with a sound mind in a sound body, that is considered happiness. … He who has a body capable of a great many things, has a mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things. …

 

P40: The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and Conversely come other more it acts, the more perfect it is.

Dem.: The more each thing is perfect, the more reality it has … and consequently … the more it acts and the less it is acted on. …

Cor.: From this it follows that the part of the mind that remains, however great it is, is more perfect than the rest.

For the eternal part of the mind … is the intellect, through which alone we are said to act … but what we have shown to perish is the imagination (by P21), through which alone we are said to be acted on … so (by P40), the intellect, however extensive it is, is more perfect than the imagination …

Schol.: … It is clear that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by another, and so on, to infinity; so that together, they all constitute god’s eternal and infinite intellect.

 

P41: Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of the first importance morality, religion, and absolutely all the things we have shown (in part IV) to be related to tenacity and nobility.

Dem.: The first and only foundation of virtue, or of the method of living rightly (by IVP22C and P24) is the seeking of our own advantage. But to determine what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the eternity of the mind, which we only came to know in the Fifth Part. …

Schol.  The usual conviction of the multitude seems to be different. … These opinions seem no less absurd to me then if someone come up because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food to eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons another deadly things, or because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, should prefer to be mindless, and to live without reason. These [common beliefs] are so absurd that they’re hardly worth mentioning.

 

P42: Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we are able to restrain them.

Dem.: Blessedness consists in love of God … I love which arises from the third kind of knowledge … so this love … must be related to the mind insofar as it acts. Therefore … it is virtue itself. …

Next, the more the mind enjoys this divine love, or blessedness, the more it understands … i.e. … the greater the power it has over the affects, and … the less it is acted on by evil affects. So because the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts. And because human power to restrain the affects consists only in the intellect, no one enjoys blessedness because he has restrained the affects. Instead, the power to restrain lusts arises from blessedness itself …

Schol.: …it is clear how much the wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than one who is ignorant and is driven only by lust. The wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit , but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true Peace of Mind.

If the way I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, still, it can be found. And of course, what is found so rarely must be hard. for if Salvation were at hand, and could be found without great effort, how could nearly everyone neglect it? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.